Orange 21 Revises Its Mary J. Blige Licensing Deal; It Will Terminate Early

On July 18, Orange 21 (Spy Optic)  amended its licensing agreement with Rose Colored Glasses (Mary J. Blige’s company). The amendment provides “…for an earlier expiration of the Company’s license to sell Mary J. Blige (“MJB”) branded sunglasses (the “License”) on March 31, 2012.” For this, they paid Rose Colored Glasses $1,000,000 at signing and issued a non-interest bearing promissory note for $500,000 that’s due March 31, 2012. The filing only provides about half a page of real information. You can read it here.

My take on Orange 21, as you know if you’ve been reading what I’ve written about them, is that the tough economy and some management issues left them without the sales volume and margins they needed to support their required advertising and promotional programs. To try and address this issue, they took what I thought was the reasonable step of making licensing agreements with O’Neil, Jimmy Buffett’s Margaritaville brand, and Mary J. Blige to produce and market sunglasses under their names.

As of their last filing, we hadn’t been told that these programs were generating any meaningful sales, but there had been a lot of expense incurred for design, promotion, inventory and required contractual payments. It appears from the amendment that the licensing deal with Ms. Blige isn’t working out quite the way Orange 21 hoped it would. We don’t have any sales numbers from any of the licensing agreements.
 
Mr. Seth Hamot, Orange 21’s principal shareholder and Chairman, through his company Costa Brava, has previously invested $7 million in Orange 21. If the licensing agreements don’t produce the hoped for revenue increases, and the fundamental strategic issue of the brand not generating enough sales to pay for a competitive marketing program can’t be resolved, he may be called on to put in some more.
 
We should see the quarterly financials shortly.  That will give us a better feel for what might be next.                

 

 

Trade Shows Re Re Re Re Re Visited; I Got an Idea. A Couple Actually. Hope One is Good.

Since ASR closed, and before that actually, we (well, me at least) have been struggling to figure out the role of trade shows as the economy, technology, and the industry changed. How do you get retailers to attend shows (paying them isn’t a good long term strategy)? Should consumers be involved somehow? What sports and products should be represented? Are shows about buying, or networking, or seeing new product or all of those or none of them? Do people even need to go to shows? How big should shows be and how long should they last? How do you keep the costs down? Do we even need another one?

Various organizations in the industry have been focused (and as far as I know, are still focused) on doing their own show individually or as a group. I’ve had a call from an organization that’s not in our industry but that does trade publications and shows for other smaller industries that wants to publish an action sports business magazine and maybe do a trade show. The existing trade show organizations are thinking about growing, or starting new shows, or just benefiting from the fact that companies that were at ASR need to exhibit somewhere else (I’m not sure that’s true).

I fell into the same thought process everybody else seems to be going through. Then I had a conversation last week with Roy Turner at Surf Expo. I always enjoy talking with Roy. He’ll tell me when he thinks I’m full of shit, though as a Southern gentleman, he’ll do it in such a way that I’ll somehow like being told. I’ve got to learn how to do that.
 
After I talked with Roy, I was thinking about what the action sports business really was (and has always been, actually), the role of fashion, consolidation, the impact of vertical retailing, and SIA and Agenda. I also reread an earlier article I wrote on trade shows right after ASR died.
 
I decided that I, and everybody else I think, have been focusing on the tactics of trade shows. That’s not necessarily a bad thing to do, but it keeps you from answering the fundamental strategic question of why ASR failed and what, if anything, should replace it. It’s kind of like when you buy an old house, you can remodel it. But it often makes more sense (financially as well as stylistically) to tear it down and start from scratch to get just what you want.
 
But we’re a pretty incestuous industry and momentum, resistance to change and cognitive dissonance (god, I love that term), makes it hard to throw out the old model and try something new.
 
What works? SIA seems to be doing really well. Why? First, because they are a one season business and just need one show. I’ve said that before. But what I’ve never realized, or at least what I so took for granted that I never thought about it, is that everybody there is somehow connected to sliding on snow. That’s strategic. It defines their purpose and who should attend.
 
The further ASR got away from that, the more they got in trouble. Like the old saying goes, if you try to be important to everybody, you end up important to nobody. Their attempted fixes were tactical, not strategic. It feels like as an industry some of that same mistake is being made because we want to dance with who we brung.
 
I’m not sure we can because there are a lot of party crashers out there. Maybe there’s a need for an “action sports” trade show but the real action sports industry is composed of those brands and retailers who cater to the participants in the sports and the first level of non-participants that associate themselves with the athletes and lifestyle. It’s pretty small. Most of the customers of most of our brands and retailers don’t fit into the action sports definition I used above.
 
What do they fit into? I’m tending towards youth culture. Hardly a new phrase, but I think very powerful if you think of a trade show in those terms, and begin painting with a blank canvas. Right now, Agenda seems closest to focusing this way and it’s interesting to watch them grow. But I’ve got a little different approach in mind.
 
If I were going to create a youth culture trade show from scratch, I’d start by developing the list of brand’s I’d want to have exhibiting. Would it include some surf/skate/snow brands? Sure. But I think I might want Apple there (who knows if they’d want to come). And Facebook. And some music companies, and some game companies, and some other brands and activities that I don’t even know about because I’m not quite as cool as I used to be. Okay, maybe I never was cool. Different issue.
 
Now if you ask me why Apple would want to attend, well, I’m not quite sure they would. This concept is not completely formed in my head. Maybe what I’d do is visit all the coolest retailers in the country, or otherwise compose a list of them (online included) and create a list of the brands they carried. The show I envision wouldn’t be about skate or surf or moto or fashion though I suspect it would include elements of all of those and more. It would be about “STUFF THAT’S IMPORTANT TO PEOPLE AGES 14 TO 25.”
 
Is it possible to do a show that would kind of cross over industries like this one would? I’m not sure. Figuring out what brands to invite and explaining how they all tied together and could benefit wouldn’t be easy. Getting retailers to decide to attend a show that wasn’t completely relevant to what they sold might be a challenge although, as I think about it, maybe retailers who see themselves focused on youth culture would come precisely because this would be the best place to find new products and brands.
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I’d also invite to attend (not to exhibit and maybe only for one specified day?) large companies who want to reach this demographic. And I’d charge them a lot of money to come. Maybe retailers wouldn’t be there that day and it would be a chance for brands to look for tie ins with large corporate players desperate to be cool.
 
A specifically action sports show made sense when we were all about action sports. Now, most of our business seems to be about youth culture (I’m open to a better term) so why aren’t we creating a youth culture trade show?
 
Partly, of course, because we can’t expect a trade organization to create a show that doesn’t cater directly to its members. But if trade shows are a waste of time unless retailers attend, then we damned well better create one that focuses on those retailers’ customer. Are they mostly action sports customers as I’ve defined them? Nope, they are youth culture customers.
 
It seems kind of obvious now and I have no idea why it took me so long to figure it out.  Please speak up if you think I’m crazy.

 

 

Dick’s Sporting Goods; Insights into the Development of the Action Sports Retail Environment

Never thought I’d be looking to Dick’s for that. Dick’s, which has been around since 1948, had revenue of $4.9 billion in 2010 from 525 stores. The 444 Dick’s stores are around 50,000 square feet each though there are some two level ones that go up to 75,000 square feet. The 81 Golf Galaxy stores are between 13,000 and 18,000 square feet. The word action sports isn’t mentioned anywhere in their most recent 10K.

What’s intriguing is their business strategy. It’s intriguing because there’s a lot that would fit right into Zumiez’s annual report. A good independent specialty retailer will tell you that he tries to do a lot of the same things.

Let’s take a look at what Dick’s business strategies are and how they compare to the generally agreed on best practices in our industry. This may tell us something about how our industry is evolving.
 
Dick’s refers to itself as an Authentic Sporting Goods Retailer.
 
“Our history and core foundation is as a retailer of high quality authentic athletic equipment, apparel and footwear, intended to enhance our customers’ performance and enjoyment of athletic pursuits, rather than focusing our merchandise selection on the latest fashion trend or style. We believe our customers seek genuine, deep product offerings, and ultimately this merchandising approach positions us with advantages in the market, which we believe will continue to benefit from new product offerings with enhanced technological features.”
 
The focus on performance and enjoyment rather than fashion is what I’ve argued action sports is really all about, though we got away from it in the good old economy days and thought everybody who carried some hard goods was a “core” retailer. I might be putting words in their mouth, but it sounds like Dick’s thinks you can be “core” for a whole bunch of sports at the same time in 50,000 square feet. Our specialty retailers try to do it with two to maybe five sports. In their most recently completed fiscal year, 54% of Dick’s revenues came from hard goods. 
 
Dick’s second strategy is Competitive Pricing. They specifically do not try to be the price leader but will match competitors’ prices.
 
“We seek to offer value to our customers and develop and maintain a reputation as a provider of value at each price point.”
 
Their sheer size gives them some pricing (and costing) leverage that action sports retailers typically don’t have. No independent specialty shop can compete on price. Dick’s also has the advantage of selling product in nearly two dozen sports and activities, with the result that they can better manage their inventory to respond to seasonality and even out cash flow.
 
Dick’s carries a Broad Assortment of Brand Name Merchandise.  “The breadth of our product selections in each category of sporting goods offers our customers a wide range of price points and enables us to address the needs of sporting goods consumers, from the beginner to the sport enthusiast.”
 
What I particularly like about this is the obvious customer definition. Dick’s thinks it’s the place to go if you’re a participant in any of the sports or activities they support. You can be a beginner or an expert and they’ve got what you need. That sounds like something an independent specialty retailer in action sports might say.    Trouble is, you can imagine Sports Authority saying it too. But Dick’s differentiates itself from Sports Authority in ways that action sports retailers would recognize. Let’s look at some more of Dick’s business strategies.
 
They offer Expertise and Service.  “We enhance our customers’ shopping experience by providing knowledgeable and trained customer service professionals and value added services.”  “We actively recruit sports enthusiasts to serve as sales associates because we believe that they are more knowledgeable about the products they sell.”
 
This means having professional golfers in the golf part of the store, certified fitness trainers helping you buy workout equipment, and trained bike mechanics to sell and service bicycles. It may be a 50,000 square foot store but in your little part of the store, where you’re buying stuff for the sport you’re committed to, you’ll be working with experts who are just as committed as you are.  That will sound familiar to any action sports retailer, chain or single store.
 
Dick’s creates Interactive “Store-Within-A-Store.” 

"Our Dick’s Sporting Goods stores typically contain five stand-alone specialty stores. We seek to create a distinct look and feel for each specialty department to heighten the customer’s interest in the products offered.”
 
Once again, that’s not exactly an unfamiliar concept. A typical store will include a pro golf shop, footwear center, fitness center, hunting and fishing area, and a team sports store with appropriate seasonal equipment and apparel.
 
Their last business strategy is Exclusive Brand Offerings that “…offer exceptional value and quality to our customers at each price point and obtain higher gross margins than we obtain on sales of comparable products.”
 
Those would be shop brands. We all recognize and understand that. But Dick’s seems to go further. They work with existing, well known brands to develop products that are available exclusively at Dick’s under that brand’s name. That’s possible only because of their size and market power.
 
Though Dick’s isn’t active in action sports, you can’t help but look at their business strategies and get some understanding for why specialty retailers are having such a hard time. Dick’s has all the advantages that come with size; purchasing power, efficient distribution, access to capital, good systems. But they’ve gone further and are applying many of the competitive techniques we use to think of as being available only to the specialty retailer to the large format business. And they can do it without having the highest prices.
 
Dick’s isn’t a direct competitor for action sports retailers, though inevitably there is some crossover of brands. But if Dick’s can do it, so can other retailers. The good news is that if you really an independent action sports retailer (that is, your customers are participants and the first level of non-participants that are serious about the lifestyle) you’re got your location and your community connections as a point of differentiation. The bad news is I think that’s all you’ve got, so you better do that right.

 

 

Tilly’s is Going Public- A First Look at Their Registration Statement (S-1)

Tilly’s started in 1982 with a single store in Orange County, California. The company name is World of Jeans & Tops, but it does business as Tilly’s. It was founded by Hezy Shaked and Tilly Levine. As of April 30 2011, they had 126 stores in 11 states averaging 7,800 square feet each. They filed last week for their initial public offering.

As is normal, the initial filing  has some important blanks not filled in yet. They will be completed as the process moves forward. In the meantime, we can look at the historical financial statements. I also want to talk about the impact of changing from an “S” corporation to a “C” corporation, the ownership structure post offering, and their competitive strengths and brand strategy. Let’s get started.

Sales have grown from $199 million in the year ended February 3, 2007 to $333 million in the year ended January 29, 2011.   During the same period, they went from 51 to 125 stores. Comparable store sales rose 17.3% in the first year of that period. They then rose 8.7% before falling 12.5% and 3.1% in the next two fiscal years and rising 6.7% in the year ended January 20, 2011. E-commerce revenues have grown from $15.4 million to $32.8 million in the last three complete years.
 
One has to wonder these days, in evaluating any consumer based IPO, whether the company can hope to return to its pre Great Recession growth any time in the next few years. It’s not the company’s fault; it’s just the economy.
 
The gross profit margin was 37.1% in the year ended February 3, 2007. The following year, it was 37.2%. For the January 31, 2009 year, it fell to 32.5% and for the most recent two years it was 30.9%. Selling, general and administrative expenses have of course grown in absolute dollars with sales, but as a percentage of sales has been more or less constant around 23.3% in the last three complete years.
 
Of the 126 stores Tilly’s has as of April 30, 72 are in California and 16 in Florida. There are also 17 in Arizona. The other 21 are distributed in 8 states with New Jersey, at 7, having the most. I would be particularly interested in learning something about the performance of the stores by location (which isn’t included). As we’ll discuss, part of their growth strategy is to increase their number of stores, and I wonder if performance has been similar in all geographies.
 
“C” and “S” Corporations 
Tilly’s has always operated as an S corporation. What this means is that the earnings were distributed to the owners who reported the income on their personal income tax returns. It also means that “No provision or liability for federal or state income tax has been provided in our financial statements except for those states where the “S” Corporation status is not recognized and for the 1.5% California franchise tax to which we are also subject as a California “S” Corporation.”
 
The chart below shows Tilly’s Operating Income and Net Income as reported on their financial statements. The Pro Forma Net Income line shows what their net income would have been over the last five years had they been a C corporation accruing tax at typical rates. Big difference. They will transition to a C corporation before the company goes public. This is disclosed in the registration statement of course. But the point is that you would not want to purchase the stock expecting Tilly’s to report net income going forward at the levels of the past.     
     

FISCAL YEAR ENDED (millions of $):
   

Feb. 3

Feb. 2

Jan. 31

Jan. 30

Jan. 29
   

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Operating Income

$31.5

$39.7

$23.8

$21.4

$24.9

Net Income (as reported)

$31.4

$39.9

$23.6

$20.9

$24.4

Pro Forma Net Income

$19.1

$24.2

$14.3

$12.7

$14.8
 
Post Offering Ownership and Control and Use of Proceeds
Buyers of this common stock will receive Class A shares and will be entitled to one vote per share. There will also be Class B shares that will be entitled to ten votes per share “on all matters to be voted on by our common shareholders.” The Class B shares will be owned by the founders and their family. When the offering is completed Mr. Shaked, who is Chairman of the Board, will control more than 50% of the total voting power of Tilly’s common stock. We don’t know from this first draft of the registration statement exactly how much he’ll control, but it says more than 50%.
 
As a result, Mr. Shaked is in a position to dictate the outcome of any corporate actions requiring stockholder approval, including the election of directors and mergers, acquisitions and other significant corporate transactions. Mr. Shaked may delay or prevent a change of control from occurring, even if the change of control could appear to benefit the stockholders.”
 
Tilly’s will be considered to be a controlled company according to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. As a result a majority of the board of directors don’t have to be independent. And the corporate governance and nominating committee and compensation committee do not have to be composed entirely of independent directors, as would otherwise be required.
 
Tilly’s says they will comply with these listing requirements anyway, but they don’t have to.
 
The company leases its 172,000 square foot corporate headquarters and distribution center from a company owned by its co-founders. It leases another 24,000 square feet of office and warehouse from one of the co-founders.
 
As usual, there are a lot of blank spaces in this early version of the Use of Proceeds section. We’ve seen from other sources that the goal is to raise $100 million. What’s going to be done with that money? The registration statement tells us the following:
 
“Therefore, our stockholders immediately following this offering, who were also the shareholders of World of Jeans & Tops prior to termination of its “S” Corporation status, will receive most of the net proceeds from the sale of shares offered by us.”
 
We don’t know what “most” is at this point.
 
After spending 30 years building a successful business, the owners deserve the benefits. But if they are getting “most” of the proceeds of the offering, where’s the money for growing the business to the 500 stores they are planning going to come from? At least that would be my perspective if I were a potential investor.
 
Competitive Strengths and Growth Strategy
Tilly’s lists six competitive strengths:
  • Destination retailer with a broad, relevant assortment.
  • Dynamic merchandise model.
  • Flexible real estate strategy across real estate venues and geographies.
  • Multi-pronged marketing approach.
  • Sophisticated systems and distribution infrastructure to support growth.
  • Experienced management team.
Their growth strategies are:
  • Expand our store base.
  • Drive comparable store sales.
  • Grow our e-commerce platform.
  •  Increase our operating margins.
If you read the discussions of their competitive strengths, you’ll note a great deal of similarity to other retailers in our space. Maybe that’s why they call them strengths and not advantages. Their growth strategies are exactly the same as every other multi store retailer.
 
It seems to me that an investor in this stock is basically betting on Tilly’s ability to operate better than its competitors. Of course they do have a successful operating history, but I don’t see an obvious competitive advantage here. I don’t think their plan to grow to 500 stores is necessarily unrealistic, but that most of the offering proceeds are being paid out to the owners makes me wonder how they’ll finance the growth.
 
We’ll get some more information as the amended S-1s show up.

 

 

Skullcandy: The IPO is Moving Forward

Skullcandy filed another amendment to their S-1 today with many of the blank spaces from the previous iterations of it filled in as the next step in their initial public offering.  It appears they postponed it due a rough patch in the market.  Smart.

They list the maximum offering price as $19 a share. They are registering 9,583,334 shares and if they sell all of those, the offering will raise a bit over $182 million. But that includes the underwriters optional over allotment of 1,250,000 shares and is before expenses.

A big chunk of the proceeds go to the selling shareholders rather than the company. After underwriting discounts, commissions, and estimated expenses, the company expects to net about $66.6 million assuming a sale price of $18 a share.
 
$16.7 million will be used to pay off their unsecured, subordinated promissory notes. They’ll pay $17.5 million in “additional consideration…pursuant to our securities purchase and redemption agreement.”  $4.4 million will be paid in accrued interest that has to be paid when the notes are converted.
 
That leaves $28 million for “general corporate purposes,” as the saying goes.
 
This will clean up their balance sheet nicely. Proceeds, of course, could vary depending on how many shares are sold and at what price.
 
I hope this is the final amendment and I can get onto reading about Tilly’s IPO. 

 

 

There Is No Action Sports Industry. Or Maybe It’s the Same as its Always Been

Sometimes I just can’t help myself. Many years ago, I wrote an article called “Are There Any Core Shops Left?” My good friend and editor at the time Sean O’Brien thought enough of it to put it on the Transworld web site for discussion. Without telling me. In hindsight, his instincts were good, but I was the slightest bit confused when I started seeing posts and getting emails that either told me how smart I was or hung me in effigy.
 
I think I might be about to do it again. What I want to tell you is that many of you who think you’re in the action sports business are wrong. And if you don’t act accordingly, things could become difficult. More difficult. I want our old economy back!
 
This has been in my head for a while in unformed ways. The launch of Nike’s Chosen campaign, their investment conference yesterday, an email I got from somebody who’s had a lot of success in our industry, and my evaluation of some of the recent industry deals including Volcom and Sanuk has caused neurons to fire and thoughts to coalesce. So let’s look at just what this industry is and has become, what I think are the major, long term, strategic trends, and the implications for how this industry, whatever it is, will change.
 
What Is the Action Sports Industry?
 
I’ve expressed an opinion about this before, but want to do it a bit more forcefully. The action sports industry is a small industry composed of businesses that sells products to participants in a number of individual sports and to the first level of non-participants that closely associate with the lifestyle and athletes. If that isn’t who most of your customers are, then you’re in the youth culture or fashion or some term I haven’t thought of business.
 
That doesn’t mean that your roots can’t be in action sports, and I’m not trying to imply any kind of criticism of a company that’s graduated out of action sports (we are way, way past any concerns about “selling out”. That almost sounds laughable now). But if you think you’re selling to action sports customers, as I’ve defined them and you’re not, you’ve got a challenge because you’re probably trying to punch outside of your weight class.
 
Why did we ever believe action sports was a bigger industry than it is? That’s easy; it’s due to 20 or 25 years of THE BEST ECONOMY EVER. With rising incomes and asset values, easy credit, and low inflation you can, as the saying goes, sell snow to the Eskimo. So any shop that sold hard goods could be known as a core store. But it wasn’t.
 
As I suggested in the title, then, the real action sports industry is a lot like it’s always been. We just thought it was different. What made it change?
 
Trends We Should Pay Attention To
 
How do you know when a successful brand has graduated out of the action sports market? That’s easy- they get acquired. Somewhere around $40 million in revenues, to pick a number, they start to get big enough to be attractive to a strategic buyer that makes it worthwhile to sell.  Hopefully, they also get smart enough to know that they don’t really have the resources, expertise, or competitive advantage to step outside the action sports market they came from without help. Expect more CONSOLIDATION as the trends I’m discussing here play out. 
 
Volcom pretty much said in their filings that industry conditions and difficulty growing meant it was time to sell while they could get a good price. Look at the deal Sanuk got. Notice that PPR’s CEO specifically said in an interview they didn’t pursue Quiksilver because they didn’t see the growth potential. Buyers want growth potential. Successful sellers know they have it, but that they can’t do it themselves.
 
And that means, if you try and grow out of the real action sports space, you’re going to face some big honking competitors. Bigger all the time. Nike’s almost its own trend. I’ll get to them. Think about Burton in the snowboard space a few years ago. Why did Burton own the hard goods market?
 
First, great product.  I’ve never heard anybody say different. Second, financial strength. That strength meant the best athletes and the biggest advertising and promotion program. So consumers wanted the product and it checked at retail at good margins as long as the distribution was well managed.
 
In its snowboard niche, Burton was like Nike in the athletic footwear market; unless they screwed up everybody was fighting over second place. But Burton has a problem Nike doesn’t have. Nike’s concern, they say, is about picking the best of their growth opportunities. Burton, as best as I can figure it out, hasn’t been able to grow much outside of its core snowboarding franchise. Even if it were for sale, Burton would not be attractive to a strategic buyer lacking that growth opportunity.
 
The lesson? Either plan to stay in the core action sports market, or be prepared to sell when you threaten to break out of it. 
 
Let’s talk about NIKE, THE ONE COMPANY TREND. At the start of this article were a couple of links to Nike that may interest you. Here’s another one to a press release on a conference they held last year. It’s worth a read. I actually have the transcript of that conference, though I can’t find it on line any more. It’s 75 pages long but worth reading. If you’re really interested, let me know and I’ll send you a copy.
 
Nike is $20 billion in revenue. As you’ve no doubt read, they are now taking the Nike brand directly into surf, skate and snow. They think they’ve now got the credibility to do that, having been somewhat cautious in their approach for a couple of years.
 
I have to say their timing surprised me a bit. For years, Nike flopped around the action sports space screwing up their attempts to get in it. Then they got a little realistic and decided to exercise some patience. They hired a few of the right people and used their unmatched product capabilities and financial strength to edge their way in cautiously. I thought they were doing fine. But it feels like they might have run out of patience sooner than they should have.
 
It will be interesting to see if the Chosen campaign is seen as authentic or arrogant.     
 
In its investment conference, Nike talked about its ability to market and merchandise a product or brand down to the city level. They pointed to their focus on customizing product for individual consumers (try it on line!). They discussed the process where an innovation from one product makes its way to other products and brands. They were very thoughtful about the integration of brick and mortar and digital and expect growth there. The analysis they’ve done about what kind of stores to put where is intriguing. And they had a good discussion of their integrated systems for managing costs and inventory, which I love.
 
Of course, it’s their investment conference, so you’d hardly expect them to highlight where things hadn’t worked out so well. Still, it was impressive. There was a clear analytic framework that I think gives them unusual flexibility for a company their size.
 
And that brings me to the email I received from the gentlemen with a lot of success in our industry who said, in part, “Based on how they [Nike] have single handedly destroyed the competitive brand environment in sports like Football, Tennis and Golf does this mean that Action Sports brands have to work on the basis that they will be relegated to being a fringe player in a culture and sport they created?”
 
Well, maybe. But let’s not over dramatize this. There’s nothing we can do about how Nike (or any of the other large companies) runs their business except, in this case, maybe learn some lessons from them based on the things they do well. I might have said this a time or two, but don’t worry too much about what the competition is doing- just run your own business well. If you adopt just a bit of Nike’s thoughtful, analytical approach to your market, you’ll be doing a good thing.
 
One thing you might think about is whether Nike is trying to ‘take over” the action sports market or just use legitimacy in that market to be credible with customers outside of what I’ve defined as action sports customers. See, this is why explaining what action sports is and being aware of how it’s changed is so important.
 
One way you need to do that is to FOCUS ON THE ECONOMY. I know it’s hard when you have to run your business on a day to day basis, but look beyond, the day, week, month, quarter and even the year. Recognize that, historically, the “good old days” were an aberration we’re not returning to in the foreseeable future. Want to know why? Go read this book so I don’t have to make a long speech. It’s a pretty easy read. The bottom line is that this is a financially caused, global recession and they last a long, long time. Always have. You must build your business around that assumption. Most of you, I hope, already have.
 
One of the economic things you’ve got to think about is inflation. You are going to see some product cost increases, and it’s not clear how much you will be able to pass through to your customers. Factor that into your financial model.
 
Next, we can’t forget VERTICAL RETAILING, which I expect will continue to grow and even accelerate. Vertical retailing is a financial and merchandising strategy that is viable partly due to changes in consumer perceptions and habits and because we’re selling a lot of product to a different consumer. You don’t have to be “core” anymore to be cool and most of our customers aren’t action sports consumers as I’ve defined them.
 
Where does this leave the “core” retailer? Well, kind of where they’ve always been if they are really core retailers; servicing the group of customers I’ve described above for whom community and expertise are the most important factors. That was never a huge market.
 
Specialty shops and small chains that really weren’t core retailers have mostly gone away. Even some really good retailers who have been around for many years are struggling. Partly that’s because we’re no longer in the best economy ever. But it’s also because they are dependent on customers outside the traditional action sports niche as I described it and don’t have an adequate advantage with those customers over the vertical retailers and large chains for the reasons we’re discussing here.
 
Some years ago, I created a list of things I thought core retailers had to do well to succeed. The list included good systems and financial data, close connection with the community, a reasonable internet presence, quality, trained employees to whom you could offer a career path, revenues in excess of $1 million and a willingness to take some risks in the product you carried as a point of differentiation.
 
It’s not a bad list, but when I wrote it I thought a specialty retailer who did all that would just kill it. Now it’s kind of a minimum bar to succeed. And doing all that isn’t enough if you’re trying to compete with the big, vertical brands for the non-action sports customer.
 
Price has become more of an issue than it ever was and (forgive this gross generalization) there is no financial model that makes sense for a specialty retailer that carries the same brands as the chains and vertical retailers and serves the same customers. This is going to be especially true as product costs rise.
 
Related to vertical retailing is distribution, or rather NOT DISTRIBUTINGHere’s a link to an article I wrote after SIA posted its sales report in March. Basically, SIA members reported higher margins and better sell through with lower sales. They sold less but earned more and created perceived value through scarcity. I’ve been beating the drum for focusing on gross margin dollars rather than sales or gross margin percent for years. It took the worst recession since the Great Depression to scare them into controlling inventories. I really hope they don’t screw it up next year.
 
Around 2000 when I took my first close look at THE INTERNET and its impact on the industry, I thought it was just another distribution channel. Maybe that was an adequate answer then, but it’s way more now.
 
It’s your most important point for customer contact and information. It’s a tool for managing and controlling inventory. There is no successful brick and mortar retail without a closely integrated internet presence. I could create a much longer list, but just imagine running your business without the internet and we’ll leave it at that. It’s no longer a choice and I guess it really hasn’t been for a long time.
 
So What?
 
Determining whether you are “action sports” or “not action sports” is obviously not as clear cut as I’ve made it sound. Most retailers and brands fit somewhere along a continuum. Yet determining who your customers are is critical (duh) and maybe the distinction I’ve made is a good way to start thinking about it. For most of you, it’s not the same customer you used to have.
 
For better or worse, big companies have learned to buy brands in our industry and support them without killing what made them special. Consumers won’t know that Volcom is owned by PPR. More importantly, if they did, they probably wouldn’t care anymore. 
 
The buyers of industry brands can’t justify their purchase prices unless those brands grow at a pace that means they take market share. So you, as an independent brand or retailer, are competing with businesses that were successful in their own right but are now backed by various 900 pound gorillas committed to growing them. Sophisticated, well managed gorillas at that.
 
Don’t despair. Just recognize the market you’re in and who you’re competing against. Then plan accordingly. Like the old saying goes, “Call on God, but row away from the rocks.”